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This paper examines the effects of a money-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion—
a helicopter drop—when an economy is in a liquidity trap. It uses a
textbook-style model calibrated to ﬁt Japan’s economic slump and de-
ﬂation as of 2003. According to the results, money-ﬁnanced transfers to-
taling 9
 4 percent of GDP end the output slump and guide the economy
to a steady state with 2 percent inﬂation. By raising output and inﬂation,
the policy also reduces the ratio of government debt to GDP. The policy’s
long-run effects are the same as those of a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion,
but money ﬁnance prevents a short-run rise in debt.
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When an economy slumps, the central bank typically stimulates aggregate spending
by reducing short-term interest rates. As Keynes famously pointed out, this policy re-
sponse is not possible if interest rates have hit a lower bound, putting the economy in
a “liquidity trap.” This problem has gained prominence from the experience of Japan,
where short-term rates were zero from 1999 to 2006. Over this period, the Bank of
Japan (BOJ) wanted to stimulate the economy, but lacked its usual interest rate tool.
Economists have debated whether a central bank in a liquidity trap has other means to
boost spending.
One suggestion is a “helicopter drop” of money (e.g., Mankiw [1999], Stevens
[2001], and Bernanke [2003]). The idea of this policy is to print money and give it
to the public, raising the public’s disposable income and spending. To implement a hel-
icopter drop, the government makes a ﬁscal transfer to the public, ﬁnanced by issuing
bonds, and the central bank purchases the bonds. That is, the government creates debt
to ﬁnance a ﬁscal expansion, but the debt is monetized.
This paper examines the effects of a helicopter drop of money. It also compares this
policy to the traditional Keynesian response to a liquidity trap: a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal
expansion without monetization. Advocates of a helicopter drop suggest that it is the
better policy because it avoids an increase in privately held government debt. Indeed,
by raising economic growth and inﬂation, a helicopter drop can reduce the ratio of debt
to GDP. This potential beneﬁt is important in the Japanese case because of concern over
high government debt.
1
This paper studies these issues in a textbook-style macro model calibrated to ﬁt the
Japanese economy. The model’s initial conditions are based on the situation in 2003,
when Japan was experiencing a liquidity trap, recession, and deﬂation. Starting from
2003 conditions, I determine what policies are needed to boost output to potential, and
derive the effects over time on output, inﬂation, and the debt-income ratio. I compare
results for a helicopter drop, a traditional ﬁscal expansion, and a baseline case with
passive monetary and ﬁscal policy.
Overall, the results are favorable to the idea of helicopter drops. For base parameter
values, a money-ﬁnanced transfer of 6.6 percent of GDP returns output to potential in a
year, and thereafter only small transfers are needed to keep it there. The output recovery
ends deﬂation and the interest rate becomes positive, allowing the central bank to return
to a more normal monetary policy.
The helicopter drop also has benign effects on the debt-income ratio. This ratio
starts falling as the economy recovers, whereas it would rise without the helicopter
drop. Part of this ﬁscal gain is permanent: a helicopter drop reduces the debt-income
ratio in the long run as well as the short run.
1. Bernanke (2003) makes this point in arguing for a money-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion: “Isn’t it irresponsible to
recommend a tax cut, given the poor state of Japanese public ﬁnances? To the contrary, from a ﬁscal perspective,
the policy would almost certainly be stabilizing, in the sense of reducing the debt-to-GDP ratio. The BOJ’s
purchases would leave the nominal quantity of debt in the hands of the public unchanged, while nominal GDP
would rise owing to increased nominal spending. Indeed, nothing would help reduce Japan’s ﬁscal woes more
than healthy growth in nominal GDP and hence in tax revenues.”
88 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 2008Helicopter Drops and Japan’s Liquidity Trap
There is an important qualiﬁcation to this success story. The monetization of the
ﬁscal transfer does not mean the transfer is forever free for the government. After the
economy recovers, the central bank has to undo its monetary expansion to prevent in-
ﬂation from rising. This requires contractionary open market operations, which cause
a jump in privately held debt. Nonetheless, the overall effect of a helicopter drop is to
reduce the debt-income ratio: the decrease in the ratio during the recovery exceeds the
increase when the central bank sells debt.
A bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion has different short-run effects than a helicopter
drop. The sale of bonds causes a temporary run-up in the debt-income ratio before the
output recovery starts to reduce it. In the long run, however, a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal
expansion leads to the same debt-income ratio as a helicopter drop. The reason is that
the initial beneﬁt from monetization is offset by the later need to undo monetization.
The rest of this paper contains six sections. Section II presents additional back-
ground, and Section III presents the model. Sections IV to VI derive the implications
of passive monetary and ﬁscal policy, a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion, and a helicop-
ter drop. Section VII concludes. (See Ball [2005a] for an analysis of the robustness of
results to changes in the model and in parameter values.)
II. Background
This section reviews the history of Japan’s economy from 1990 to 2003. I use the
experience of this period to guide my modeling of the economy. The situation in 2003
is summarized in Table 1. In simulating alternative policies, I use data from 2003 as
initial conditions.
Figure 1 [1] shows the log of real output. Output growth averaged 1.3 percent per
year over 1990–2003, compared to 4.0 percent from 1980 to 1990. Early in the slump,
some blamed it on slow growth of potential output due to “structural” factors. Today,
however, most economists agree that output fell below potential because of deﬁcient
demand. Apparent demand shocks include a collapse in asset prices, a credit crunch,
and policy mistakes (e.g., Hoshi and Kashyap [2004] and Posen [2003]).
There is, of course, uncertainty about the gap between output and potential out-
put. Following McCallum (2000) and Hoshi and Kashyap (2004), Figure 1 presents a
path for potential based on the assumption that it has grown 2 percent per year since
1990. This approach produces an output gap of
￿
￿ percent in 2003. Using production
functions, some researchers have estimated gaps of around
￿
￿ percent (e.g., Ahearne























89Figure 1 Japan’s Slump





Figure 1 [2] shows inﬂation, as measured by the GDP deﬂator and by core CPI. The
slump of the 1990s dragged inﬂation down, as predicted by the accelerationist Phillips
curve. In 2000, inﬂation reached about
￿
￿ percent (a bit higher for the CPI and a bit
lower for the deﬂator). After that, inﬂation remained fairly constant. I use
￿
￿ percent
as the initial value of inﬂation.
The stability of inﬂation after 2000 is not consistent with a conventional Phillips
curve. Such an equation predicts accelerating deﬂation when the output gap is negative.
The causeof thisanomaly isunclear, but Blanchard (2000) suggestsone possibility. The
accelerationist Phillips curve is based on the assumption that expected inﬂation equals
past inﬂation. This relation breaks down if people view deﬂation as transitory—if they
expect a return to non-negative inﬂation. In this case, an output slump causes deﬂation
but not accelerating deﬂation. I will incorporate this idea in the paper’s model.
2
Figure 1 [3] and [4] shows the behavior of monetary policy. The BOJ responded
to the slump and falling inﬂation by cutting the short-term interest rate. Leigh (2004)
shows that a conventional Taylor rule captures this behavior up to 1998. At that point,
2. Econometric research suggests that the Japanese Phillips curve broke down sometime in the 1990s. See
Fukao (2004).
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the Taylor-rule interest rate became negative, and the actual rate hit the zero bound. The
interest rate stayed close to zero after that.
The monetary base grew steadily as the interest rate fell. Base growth accelerated
under the policy of “quantitative easing,” which entailed large open market operations.
The base grew 26 percent in 2002 and 16 percent in 2003, reaching 20 percent of GDP.
With the interestratestuck atzero, thismonetary expansion did not haveobvious effects
on output or inﬂation. This experience is consistent with a textbook liquidity trap.
Finally, Figure 2 shows the path of net government debt as a percentage of GDP.








￿ in 2003. This experience led to a downgrading
of Japan’s debt to A2/AA
￿, the rating for many developing countries, in 2002. In the
early 2000s, many economists feared that Japan was heading for a ﬁscal crisis, possibly
even for default. For that reason, we will look for policies that boost the economy out
of a liquidity trap without exacerbating the debt problem.
III. The Model
The experience we have reviewed is largely explained by textbook macro models. A
fall in aggregate demand reduced output, and monetary policy was ineffective because
the interest rate hit the zero bound. Kuttner and Posen (2001) state, “The basic lesson of
Japan’s Great Recession for policymakers is to trust what you learned in intermediate
macroeconomics class.” In that spirit, I study a model with textbook equations such as
an IS curve and a money demand function. I add simple dynamics following Svensson
(1997) and Ball (1999). The only unorthodox equation is the Phillips curve, which is
modiﬁed to capture Japan’s steady deﬂation.
The model is “backward-looking,” with expectations of future variables determined
by past variables. Thus, the analysis differs from much of the literature on liquidity
traps, which emphasizes forward-looking behavior. Section VII compares forward- and
backward-looking models of liquidity traps.






￿ percent per year. Actual output
￿ deviates from poten-

























































￿ is real transfers from the government,
" is the real interest rate,
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# is the nominal rate and
  is inﬂation. In other words, the output gap depends
on the lagged gap, the lagged real interest rate, and lagged transfers. The one-year lags
are consistent with Japanese evidence.
2. Inﬂation


















































The conventional assumption holds when lagged inﬂation is non-negative, but expecta-






￿, (2) and (3) imply that






￿, output determines the level
of inﬂation, as suggested by Blanchard (2000).
3
3. Money
The central bank controls the stock of base money,
￿, through open market operations.













$ is central bank purchases of government bonds (
$
 
￿ means sales of bonds).































￿ is the price level. This equation imposes a unit income elasticity of money
demand (which is consistent with Japanese data). At positive interest rates, there is a







￿. This change does not greatly









￿ and policy is passive, the economy falls into a spiral of accelerating deﬂation.
92 MONETARY AND ECONOMIC STUDIES/DECEMBER 2008Helicopter Drops and Japan’s Liquidity Trap
constant interest rate semi-elasticity; at a zero interest rate, money demand becomes
ﬂat. Figure 3 shows the money demand function in a graph.
4. Debt
I measure Japan’s ﬁscal problem with privately held debt, which excludes debt held
by the central bank. Thus, I ignore the separate balance sheets of the government and
central bank and treat them as one entity. Nominal debt
￿








































Debt is past debt plus changes from four sources: interest payments on the past debt;
current nominal transfers; open market purchases, which reduce debt; and a term
for the government’s primary surplus in the absence of transfers. This surplus is






￿ ). It varies procyclically
when output ﬂuctuates.
Inreality,Japan’sprimary surpluswouldprobably benegativeevenifoutput wereat
potential. Ignoring this fact helps us isolate the effects of exogenous ﬁscal expansions.






Table 2 presents base values for the model’s parameters. Generally these values are
based on studies of the Japanese economy, which have estimated parameters such as
the Phillips curve slope (
 ) and the interest semi-elasticity of money demand (
 ). See
Ball (2005a) for citations and further discussion of the parameter settings.
Two assumptions are worth highlighting. The ﬁrst concerns
Æ, the coefﬁcient on
ﬁscal transfers in the IS equation. This parameter is critical to the effects of helicopter






￿ from Kuttner and Posen (2001), who estimate the
Figure 3 Money Demand
































































￿ in year 10
effect of transfers on output using the structural vector autoregression (VAR) technique
of Blanchard and Perotti (2002). Kuttner and Posen’s estimated effect is substantial,
although smaller than the effect that Blanchard and Perotti ﬁnd for the United States.





￿ rises over time: it starts at
￿
￿ percent and rises linearly to
￿
￿ percent over
10 years. As detailed in Ball (2005a), Japan’s neutral rate appeared negative during
the liquidity trap of the early 2000s, but this situation was not permanent. It reﬂected
problems speciﬁc to the period, such as low conﬁdence and weakness in the banking
system. Therefore, it is plausible to assume that
"
￿ eventually rises to
￿
￿ percent, a
normal level for a developed economy.
The assumption of a rising
"
￿ implies that the economy eventually escapes the
liquidity trap, even if policy is passive. As
"




￿ in the IS equation
falls, stimulating spending. We will see, however, that economic recovery is very slow
unless policymakers take action to speed it up.
IV. A Baseline Policy
This section derives the path of the economy when no special policy is introduced to
attack the liquidity trap. Monetary policy is modeled as following the approach of the





￿. This exercise provides
a baseline for measuring the effects of monetary and ﬁscal expansions.
A. Monetary Policy
Recall that the BOJ appeared to follow a Taylor rule until the interest rate hit zero. This













































￿ is an inﬂation target. The variable
#
￿ is the interest rate dictated by a Taylor




￿ is positive, and zero if
#
￿ is negative. BOJ ofﬁcials have suggested the same rule
in describing their policy (Baba et al. [2005]). I assume here that this policy continues
indeﬁnitely.
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￿ determine open market purchases,




￿ is not determined by the rule, because money demand is ﬂat. In this case, I





￿. That is, I assume
the BOJ does not pursue open market operations if they do not affect the interest rate.
(Ball [2005a] considers an alternative assumption.)
In the Taylor rule, the coefﬁcients
￿ and
￿ are chosen as follows. Taylor rules with
certain parameters are equivalent to “ﬂexible” inﬂation targeting: a policy that returns
inﬂation to
 
￿ at a ﬁxed rate (see Svensson [1997] and Ball [1999] for proofs in similar












I assume the inﬂation target
 
￿ is
￿ percent, which is close to the targets of many
countries.
Given initial conditions and the policy rule, it is straightforward to derive the evolu-
tion of the economy. Each period,
￿ and
  are determined by past conditions through
(1)–(3). Inﬂation
  determines the price level
￿. The policy rule determines
#,
￿,a n d
$, as described above. Finally, equation (6) determines
￿.
B. Results
Figure 4 shows the paths of some key variables: the output gap,
 ,
#, and the ratios of
$,
￿,a n d
￿ to GDP. Starting from period
￿, output stays in a deep slump for several
years and then slowly recovers as
"
￿ increases. The output gap rises above
￿
￿ percent









￿ percent and then inches up as the economy recovers. It be-
comes positive in year 11. Through that year, the Taylor rule prescribes a negative
interest rate, so
# is stuck at zero.
In year 12, the recovery pushes the Taylor-rule interest rate above zero. The rule
begins to operate, and it guides inﬂation smoothly to the target of
￿ percent. Output
temporarily overshoots potential as inﬂation rises.
While the interest rate is zero, the money stock is constant and nominal GDP grows
(the growth in
￿ exceeds the fall in
￿). The money
 GDP ratio declines slowly. In year
12, when the interest rate becomes positive, the money
 GDP ratio falls by more than
half. This occurs through a large monetary contraction: open market purchases,
$,a r e
￿
￿ percent of GDP. This action is needed because of the high level of money at the
start of the simulation. Although the money
 GDP ratio falls in years 1–11, it remains
far above the level that produces a positive interest rate. Thus, a large money absorption
is needed when the Taylor rule takes effect.






in year 12, when the large monetary contraction occurs. The BOJ’s sales of government
bonds raise the level of privately held debt.
In a steady state, the debt-income ratio falls slowly. The primary deﬁcit is zero, and





￿ percent. The fall in
95Figure 4 Baseline Case
the debt ratio results from seigniorage revenue, as
$
 





￿ in year 25.
V. A Bond-Financed Fiscal Expansion
This section examines how a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion changes the evolution
of the economy. This exercise is a step toward analyzing a helicopter drop, which
combines a ﬁscal expansion with a monetary expansion.
A. The Policy
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However, this policy is now accompanied by ﬁscal transfers. These transfers add to
government debt through equation (6). The transfers begin in year 1; given the lag in
the IS curve, they start affecting output in year 2. The transfers are chosen to end the
slump quickly and permanently: the output gap is non-negative in years 2, 3, ....Each
period, the government makes the smallest transfer sufﬁcient to achieve this result.
To state this policy formally, let
￿
￿













￿ can be computed from the IS curve given the state at
















If a positive transfer is needed to keep output at potential, it is made. If a negative
transfer would keep output at potential, no transfer is made. In this case, output exceeds
potential.
B. The Path of Transfers















￿, this transfer is needed to produce a zero output gap in period








output in year 2, less than 1 percent in years 3 and 4, and zero thereafter. The neces-




￿ falls, stimulating spending. (The real rate falls
because
  rises, and
"
￿ rises by assumption.) The cumulative transfer over years 1–4 is
￿
 
  percent of output.
This ﬁscal expansion is large by historical standards, but not gigantic. Over the
1990s, Japan experienced a series of changes in taxes and government spending
(Kuttner and Posen [2001]). Several of these shifts amounted to
￿ percent of GDP or
more; a 1998 stimulus package was
  percent. The total effect of ﬁscal policy was
small, because expansions in some years were offset by contractions in others (such as
Figure 5 The Fiscal Expansion
97the 1997 tax increase). The key difference between the transfers proposed here and past
practice is that policy pushes consistently in one direction.
C. Effects of the Transfers
Figure 6 shows the effects of ﬁscal transfers. It compares the economy’s path under
the transfer rule (8) (the dashed line) to the baseline case without transfers (the solid
line). By construction, the transfers return output to potential in year 2; most of the long
slump in the baseline case is eliminated. The faster recovery implies that inﬂation and
the interest rate start rising sooner than before. Nonetheless, the Taylor rule guides the
economy to the same steady state, with
￿ percent inﬂation.





compared to 0.81 in the baseline case. After that, the ratio falls rapidly as the transfers
Figure 6 Effects of Fiscal Expansion
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 ); in year 3, the ratio with transfers falls
below the baseline case. It remains lower in all future years, except for year 11, when it
is slightly higher. (The result for year 11 reﬂects the fact that the nominal interest rate
rises earlier with transfers. The jump in debt from the necessary monetary contraction
occurs sooner.)
In the steady state, the debt-income ratio falls slowly in both the baseline case and
the case with transfers. However, the path of the ratio is lower with transfers. In year








￿ without them. Thus, the transfers produce
a win-win scenario: they end the output slump quickly and they improve the long-run
ﬁscal situation.







cent, so the transfers raise output by a total of
!
￿ percent of potential. The effect of



















  percent of potential. Thetransfersalsoreducethe debt-income ratio
by raising inﬂation. Inﬂation reaches zero in year 3, while it stays negative through year
10 in the baseline case. The faster rise in inﬂation reduces real interest rates on the debt.
VI. A Money-Financed Fiscal Expansion
This section considers ﬁscal transfers ﬁnanced by printing money rather than issuing
debt. I ask whether money ﬁnance produces lower debt-income ratios, as suggested by
Bernanke and others.
A. The Policy
In this experiment, the ﬁscal transfers are the same as before (see the path in Figure 5).
There are positive transfers in years 1 through 4. The government ﬁnances the transfers
by issuing bonds, and the central bank buys the bonds. The central bank’s purchases



















These actions raise the money stock by the amount of the transfers, and leave privately
held debt unchanged. Thus, they are equivalent to a helicopter drop of money.
After year 4, monetary policy behaves as in the previous experiments. Open market
purchases are zero until the Taylor rule prescribes a positive interest rate, and then this
rule determines policy.
B. Results
The ﬁscal multiplier does not depend on how transfers are ﬁnanced. Thus, switching
from debt to money ﬁnance does not change the path of output. There is also no effect
on inﬂation or the interest rate, since the Phillips curve and Taylor rule are unchanged.
The only changes are in open market operations, the money stock, and debt. Figure 7
99shows the paths of these variables. It compares the case of money-ﬁnanced transfers
(the dotted lines) to the cases of bond-ﬁnanced transfers and no transfers.
When the transfers are money-ﬁnanced, the money/income ratio jumps up in year 1.
In contrast to the case of bond ﬁnance, the debt-income ratio does not rise sharply.
In years 1 through 9, the money-income ratio is higher with money ﬁnance, and the
debt-income ratio is lower by the same amount. Policymakers have substituted money
for debt.
Things change in year 10, when the Taylor rule becomes operative. As before, con-
tractionary open market operations are needed to reduce money to the level consistent
with the Taylor rule. The necessary open market sales are larger in the case of money-
ﬁnanced transfers, because the money-income ratio is higher in year 9. The extra sales
of debt raise the debt-income ratio to its path in the bond-ﬁnance case. In other words,
the monetization of debt in years 1–4 is reversed in year 10: money is turned back into
debt. Starting in year 10, the initial ﬁnancing of transfers is irrelevant to all variables in
the model.
In light of these results, does it matter how transfers are initially ﬁnanced? Mone-
tization has no effect on output or inﬂation, and no long-run effect on debt. However,
it prevents the jump in the debt-income ratio that occurs in year 1 if transfers are debt-
ﬁnanced. With money ﬁnance, the debt-income ratio never signiﬁcantly exceeds its
level in the baseline case. Thus, monetization matters if we care about the short-run
path of debt, not just its steady-state behavior.
Figure 7 Money-Finance versus Debt-Finance
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Do we care about the short-run path of debt? To address this question, we must go
beyond the model and ask why debt matters. A high debt-income ratio is dangerous
because investors may start to fear default, sparking a ﬁnancial crisis (Ball and Mankiw
[1996]). Higher debt at a point in time might increase this danger, even holding
constant the long-run behavior of debt. Investors are more likely to panic when they
hold more debt, because they have more to lose from an immediate default. However,
the importance of this effect is unclear. The case for money-ﬁnanced transfers is not as
compelling as some economists suggest.
4
C. A Permanent Monetary Expansion
In the previous experiment, the increase in money that ﬁnances transfers is reversed
in the long run. This fact follows from the conventional assumption that the central
bank eventually follows a Taylor rule. However, the reversal of the monetary expansion
differs from some economists’ suggestions. Bernanke (2003), for example, advocates
money-ﬁnanced transfers for which “much or all of the increase in the money stock is
viewed as permanent.” Here I consider such a policy. As one might guess, the policy
prevents the debt-income ratio from jumping up at any point. Unfortunately, it also
produces hyperinﬂation.
Speciﬁcally, I assume again that transfers are governed by equation (8), and that
they are ﬁnanced by money creation. Monetary policy after the transfers is the same
as in earlier experiments, except for a constraint: open market purchases must be non-
negative. That is, after the money stock rises, it can never fall. This constraint ﬁrst binds










Figure 8 shows the effects of this policy. Through year 9, we see the same effects
of money-ﬁnanced transfers as before. In year 10, the Taylor rule starts calling for
large open market sales, but they do not occur. Consequently, the money-income ra-
tio stays high and the nominal interest rate stays at zero. The failure to tighten policy
causes output and inﬂation to rise. At this point, the economy enters an unstable spiral:
higher inﬂation reduces the real rate, which raises output, which further raises inﬂation.
Without reducing money, the central bank cannot raise the interest rate to abort this
process. Inﬂation reaches
￿ percent in year 15 and 90 percent in year 25, and keeps
rising forever.
5
BOJ ofﬁcials have criticized the idea of money-ﬁnanced transfers on the grounds
that they would eventually produce high inﬂation. Figure 8 shows a scenario in which
this fear is realized. We have seen that policymakers can prevent this outcome by
4. Goodfriend (2000) and Suda (2003) argue that a monetary expansion to ﬁnance transfers would eventually have
to be reversed, with adverse ﬁscal consequences. Their arguments anticipate the results of this section. Auerbach
and Obtsfeld (2004) present a model in which expansionary open market operations reduce debt permanently.
This result contradicts my ﬁnding that monetization of debt is irrelevant in the long run. The differences between
Auerbach and Obstfeld’s results and mine arise from different assumptions about inﬂation. In the Auerbach and
Obstfeld (2004) model, a monetary expansion causes inﬂation to rise, reducing real government debt, even when
the interest rate is zero. After that, inﬂation falls without a fall in output. In my model, monetary policy cannot
affect inﬂation at a zero interest rate, and a fall in inﬂation requires lower output and tax revenue.
5. Eventually inﬂation reduces the money-income ratio sufﬁciently that the nominal interest rate starts rising.
However, it rises more slowly than inﬂation, so the real rate falls forever.
101Figure 8 A Permanent Monetary Expansion
reducing the money stock when inﬂation starts rising. But this action reverses the ﬁscal
gain that money ﬁnance is intended to achieve.
VII. Conclusion
This paper examines the effects of a helicopter drop—a money-ﬁnanced ﬁscal
transfer—when an economy is in a liquidity trap. The model is calibrated to capture
Japan’s recession and deﬂation in 2003. The results are generally favorable to helicop-
ter drops. Transfers totaling
￿
 
  percent of GDP return output to potential quickly, and
the economy converges to a steady state with
￿ percent inﬂation. By increasing output
and inﬂation, the policy also reduces the ratio of government debt to GDP.
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This paper also compares a helicopter drop to a bond-ﬁnanced ﬁscal expansion. In
the model, the two policies have the same effects on output and inﬂation. They also
have the same long-run effects on the debt
 GDP ratio. However, bond-ﬁnanced trans-
fers cause debt to rise in the short run, while money-ﬁnanced transfers do not. This
difference is an advantage of money ﬁnance, as rising debt could shake conﬁdence in
Japan’s economy.
Some economists argue that ﬁscal transfers, whether ﬁnanced by money or debt, are
ineffective for stimulating Japan’s economy. They claim that Japan tried ﬁscal expan-
sions during the 1990s without success. If this view were correct, it would undermine
this paper’s argument for helicopter drops.
However, Posen (1998) and Kuttner and Posen (2001) show that ﬁscal policy is
effective in Japan. As noted earlier, Kuttner and Posen (2001) present econometric ev-
idence of a substantial ﬁscal multiplier. They also discredit the alleged examples of
unsuccessful ﬁscal policy, showing that several “expansion” programs failed because
they were not really expansions—they consisted mainly of normal expenditures. When
true ﬁscal expansions occurred, as in 1995, output responded.
The policies considered in this paper—transfers ﬁnanced with money or
bonds—differ from those discussed in much of the literature on liquidity traps. Papers
such as Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) and Auerbach and Obstfeld (2004) analyze
models with forward-looking inﬂation expectations. In these models, central banks can
engineer an escape from a liquidity trap through policies that manipulate expectations.
Announcing an inﬂation or price-level target, for example, can raise expected inﬂation.
Higher expected inﬂation reduces the real interest rate, stimulating spending.
This paper has ignored such policies because, in contrast to ﬁscal transfers, there
is little evidence that they are effective. Policy announcements affect inﬂation expecta-
tions in theory, but not in practice. Empirical work generally ﬁnds that inﬂation expec-
tations are tied to past inﬂation—they are backward-looking. Expectations do not shift
when new policies are announced; they only shift when people see inﬂation change.
For example, policymakers in many countries have tried to manipulate inﬂation ex-
pectations to decrease the costs of disinﬂation. They have sought to reduce expected
inﬂation by announcing such policies as inﬂation targets, new mandates for the cen-
tral bank, or greater central bank independence. Historical analyses ﬁnd that these an-
nouncements do not succeed in changing expectations (see Ball [2005b]). Expected
inﬂation falls only after actual inﬂation falls, which happens when the central bank
raises interest rates and reduces output. There is no reason to think that efforts to raise
expected inﬂation, as proposed for Japan, would be more successful.
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